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Abstract
Recent work documents that better legal institutions are associated with broader equity markets. We investigate
whether differences in legal institutions also help explain the international cross-section of expected stock
returns. Three main regularities emerge. First, total stock market returns are positively correlated with overall
measures of the quality of institutions, such as judicial efficiency and rule of law, controlling for risk. Second,
dividend yields and earning-price ratios also correlate positively with judicial efficiency and rule of law,
controlling for risk and expected earnings growth. Thirdly, equity returns have no relationship with the degree of
protection of minority shareholders granted by the letter of the law. These findings suggest that equity markets
are segmented, and that differences in monitoring, auditing and other enforcement costs are not the sole reason
for segmentation. We interpret the positive cross-country correlation between the overall quality of the legal
system and the expected return on equity as resulting from the curtailment of insiders’ private benefits and the
increase of firms’ profitability associated with better institutions.
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Understanding the determinants of the international cross-section of stock returns has
proved a daunting task for research to date. The explanatory power of the International
Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) is typically found to be quite low (see, among others,
Solnik, 1977, Ferson and Harvey, 1994). Several authors (see Bekaert and Harvey, 1995, for
example) attribute this to the empirical failure of the assumption that equity markets are
perfectly integrated. In this paper we suggest that a better understanding of this subject can be
achieved by combining the traditional asset pricing approach with the law and finance
approach – two strands of literature so far totally disjoint.
Recent cross-country empirical work by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997, 1998) [henceforth LLSV] shows that external equity financing correlates with
differences in legal rules and in their enforcement. More specifically, the share of stock
market capitalization held by minorities and the number of initial public offerings correlate
positively with the degree of respect for the law, the quality of judicial enforcement and the
legal protection of minority shareholders’ property rights. LLSV interpret this finding as
evidence that opportunistic behavior by managers and controlling shareholders is less likely
when the legal protection of investors is strong and its judicial enforcement is swift and cost-
effective.
1
An obvious question then arises. Do differences in the protection of minority shareholders’
rights and, more generally, in the protection of property rights result also in cross-country
differentials in risk-adjusted expected returns? In this paper, we take this question to the data.
In theory, the legal environment can affect the severity of agency problems between
company insiders and outside shareholders in two ways. First, it may directly affect the
private benefits that managers are able to extract from their companies. Second, it determines
the auditing and judicial costs that shareholders expect to incur in order to secure payment of
dividends by managers. International differences along these two dimensions of the legal
environment have different effects on equilibrium stock returns, depending on the degree of
international integration of stock markets.
In a perfectly integrated stock market, risk-adjusted equity returns should be independent
of the legal system if this affects only the amount of corporate resources that managers can
divert to themselves: equity prices will discount the private benefits to be extracted by
managers, so as to equalize the expected risk-adjusted rate of return across countries. If
instead, as a result of poor legal protection, investors must bear monitoring and auditing costs
to enforce their claims to corporate dividends, equilibrium expected returns must compensate
them for such costs, as well as for non-diversifiable market risk. In the latter case, more
1  Modigliani and Perotti (1997) also highlight the relationship between the enforceability of contracts and the availability
of external finance.8
investor-friendly legal institutions should be associated with lower risk-adjusted returns on
equity.
2
When international equity markets are segmented for additional reasons (see for instance
Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996), the relationship between risk-adjusted returns and the quality
of the institutional framework is more complex. First, with segmented equity markets, also the
amount of private benefits matters for equilibrium stock returns. Since the risk-bearing
capacity of domestic investors is limited, higher amounts of equity funding come forth only if
companies are willing to pay a higher expected rate of return. Stricter legal limits to
managerial opportunism allow companies to credibly pledge higher returns and thereby obtain
a larger amount of equity funding. In this case, therefore, countries with lower levels of
private benefits of control can feature higher risk-adjusted rates of return, in equilibrium.
Under segmented markets, institutions can also affect equilibrium returns through a
completely different channel, independently of the presence of agency problems between
insiders and outside investors. Namely, fair legal rules and a trustworthy judicial system may
widen the menu of enforceable contracts, thus increasing the profitability of the corporate
sector and hence its demand for (equity) financing. Ceteris paribus, also this effect would
result in a higher equilibrium rate of return on equity.
In our study, we face some well-known problems in measuring risk-adjusted expected
returns on equity. The first is that expectations are not directly observable. Second, several
measures of the return on equity can be used. For a public company, the return on its shares,
the earnings-price ratio, and the dividend yield are all candidate measures, each with its own
strengths and weaknesses. For a private company seeking its first listing, instead, a more
relevant measure may be the excess return of its shares in initial public offerings (IPOs).
Thirdly, measures such as the return on secondary markets must be corrected for
undiversifiable risk (and for diversifiable risk if equity markets are internationally
segmented), while others, such as the earnings-price ratio, must be purged of the component
reflecting cross-country differentials in expected earnings growth.
We document a rich set of empirical regularities. Of these, the most robust finding is that
the risk-adjusted return on equity is positively associated with the respect for the law and the
efficiency of the judicial system. This is evidence that equity markets are segmented, since
under capital market integration this correlation should be zero, or even negative if cross-
country legal differences translate into different auditing and monitoring costs for investors.
This finding agrees with much of the empirical literature in this area (see for example Roll
(1992), Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and Bekaert and Harvey (1995), among others). The
novelty of our evidence is that, even controlling for cross-country differences in legal and
judicial institutions, there are other sources of international segmentation affecting the cross-
section of expected returns. We also find that popular measures of the formal protection of
minority shareholders’ rights are not correlated with risk-adjusted equity returns.
2  A similar effect arises in Merton’s (1987) CAPM model when an innovation reduces the costs of obtaining reliable
information about a company and thereby expands its shareholder base. The expected return on the stock declines as the
fraction of investors informed about the stock rises.9
Our paper also contributes to the small but growing empirical literature on law and finance,
and especially to the interpretation of the seminal work by LLSV.
3 First, our results show the
importance of controlling for risk in assessing the correlation between institutional variables
and asset returns. LLSV (1999), using international company-level data, find that the cash-
flow/price ratio is negatively related to shareholder rights protection, and interpret this as
resulting from less severe agency problems. But their correlation could be driven by an
omitted risk variable. If, for example, countries with better protection of shareholder rights are
also safer investment havens for an international asset manager, then companies in those
countries would fetch higher valuation irrespective of agency problems.
4 Second, our
evidence of international equity market segmentation suggests that also the results of LLSV
(1997) should be taken with caution: the relative size of equity markets may be affected by
omitted country-specific factors, over and beyond the quality of each country’s legal
institutions, potentially leading to biased estimates. Using a panel of industry-level data,
Lombardo (2000) builds on this point, and controls for country effects (and industry effects)
in his empirical assessment of the effect of institutions on the risk-adjusted expected return on
equity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a simple analytical framework
to interpret the evidence. In section 3 we describe the data. In section 4 we report our results,
which are based on different measures of the return on equity: secondary market returns,
accounting measures, and excess returns on primary equity issues. Section 5 concludes.
2.  A Simple Model
In this section we briefly illustrate the channels through which legal variables may affect
the equilibrium rate of return on equity. The analysis, for brevity presented only graphically,
is based on a simple model presented in Lombardo and Pagano (2000), and is meant as a tool
to organize ideas and interpret the empirical findings presented in subsequent sections.
3  Our paper is indirectly related to a set of recent papers on the effect of financial development on growth, which employ
legal variables mainly to instrument financial development measures in their growth regressions. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) point out that firms and industries that are more dependent on external finance tend to grow faster in countries
where financial markets are better developed, and test this prediction on a large panel of industry-level cross-country
data. Carlin and Mayer (1998) build on the Rajan-Zingales approach to probe further into the relationships between
industrial activity, financial systems and legal arrangements, and conclude that market-based finance and legal protection
of investors are correlated with the growth of equity-financed and skill-intensive industries. Demirgüc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998) test the same hypothesis on firm-level data from thirty countries. They estimate the maximum growth
rate that each firm of their sample could attain without access to long-term financing, and compare these potential growth
rates to those attained by firms in countries with different legal and financial systems. They show that in countries with
better legal systems, more active stock markets and larger banking sectors, a greater fraction of firms fund growth by
external long-term finance.
4  In our data, for instance, stock market returns are negatively correlated with judicial efficiency when one does not control
for risk, but the relationship becomes positive when one controls for risk.10
As mentioned in the introduction, the legal environment can affect the equilibrium rate of
return on equity by tempering the agency problems between managers and shareholders. This
can occur in two ways. First, better legal institutions may reduce the fraction of corporate
resources that managers are able to divert. For instance, legal limits to managerial discretion
concerning asset sales or merger agreements may curtail the scope for dilution of minority
shareholders’ income rights. Second, legal rules, accounting standards and courts' efficiency
determine the auditing and judicial costs that shareholders incur to keep managers in line. For
example, the availability of class action suits and the possibility of voting by mail reduces the
cost of shareholder activism and increases its effectiveness.
5  For brevity, we shall refer to the
first effect of better legal institutions as a “reduction of private benefits” and to the second as
a “reduction in auditing costs”.
6
In addition, better law enforcement may benefit companies by expanding the set of
contracts with suppliers and customers that can be enforced in court. Equivalently it can
reduce the cost of enforcing these contracts. Ex ante, this enables each company to draw upon
a wider menu of economic transactions, which should increase its profitability. This effect
differs from the previous two because it does not hinge on the existence of agency problems
between the company and its financiers. We refer to it as a “pure profitability effect”.
The three effects are illustrated graphically in Figures 1 to 3, which refer to the case of
imperfect international integration (the underlying model in Lombardo and Pagano, 2000,
encompasses perfect international integration as a special case). In all three figures, the
upward sloping line is the supply of equity funds to companies: the more closely integrated
the country is in world capital markets, the lower is its slope. A perfectly integrated market
features a flat (perfectly elastic) supply of equity. The rate of return that companies can
generate for each possible level of equity funding is instead a downward sloping locus, owing
to the decreasing marginal productivity of capital: we label it the profitability schedule. When
managers can extract private benefits, however, companies cannot pledge their entire profits
to compensate shareholders for their funds, but only a fraction of them. The rate of return
after managerial diversion determines the (inverse) demand function for equity funds. The
vertical distance between the profitability schedule and the demand function is the amount of
private benefits per dollar invested.
5  Managers’ opportunistic behavior may also create another cost for shareholders: more volatile earnings than warranted by
technology and demand conditions, and therefore additional risk. Then shareholders will require compensation for this
additional risk, if they cannot easily diversify it away. In fact, they may be unable to diversify it away precisely because
of the agency problem: when the costs of keeping managers in line are large, only large shareholders are willing to incur
them, since they internalize the benefits of monitoring sufficiently.
6  Lombardo and Pagano (2000) assume that expected legal and auditing costs are proportional to the initial investment, so
that they can disregard subtle theoretical issues that arise if small shareholders free-ride on the monitoring activity of
large shareholders. However, this simplifying assumption does not affect the qualitative results of their analysis. Even if
small shareholders don’t incur monitoring expenses, the expected costs to keep managers in check will enter equilibrium
expected returns. This is because large shareholders must be compensated for the anticipated monitoring costs, and in this
scenario the large investor is the marginal investor for pricing purposes. In addition, small shareholders may still require
a premium in jurisdictions where their interests are not well protected, because they anticipate the cost of checking that
large shareholders do not collude with managers. These proportional costs can alternatively be viewed as load fees
charged by a mutual fund that shareholders join in order to overcome the free-riding problem associated with monitoring
expenses. Naturally, where expected monitoring costs are higher, the mutual fund managers will charge higher fees.11
The equilibrium rate of return is found at the intersection between the demand and the
supply of equity funds. The cost of capital to the company (gross of private benefits) is read
on the corresponding point on the profitability schedule and determines the real investment
decisions of its management.
A reduction of private benefits reduces the wedge between the profitability schedule and
the demand schedule. As illustrated in Figure 1, this increases both the equilibrium rate of
return and the quantity of external equity, while it reduces the cost of capital to companies.
The effect on the rate of return, however, is smaller the flatter is the supply schedule. In the
limit, in a perfectly integrated stock market, the effect vanishes altogether (while that on the
quantity is maximal).
Conversely, a reduction in the auditing costs shifts the supply curve down and to the right.
As shown in Figure 2, this reduces the equilibrium rate of return, and increases the quantity of
external finance. Again, the cost of capital to companies decreases. The directions of these
effects are independent of the degree of equity integration: they persist even if the supply
schedule is perfectly elastic.
Finally, if an improvement in the legal environment has a pure profitability effect, it will
cause an outward shift of both the profitability and the demand schedules. As illustrated in
Figure 3, this will increase both the observed rate of return and the amount of equity financing
(the cost of equity capital may change in either direction). If the supply curve is flat, the
increase in profitability does not result into an increase in the observed rate of return, as in the
case of a private benefit reduction.
In summary, in an internationally integrated stock market, the effect of better institutions
on the rate of return is either zero or negative. With segmented markets, their effect is
predicted to be positive if they reduce private benefits or increase firm profitability, and
negative if they lower the auditing costs for which investors need to be compensated. The
effect on the equilibrium quantity is always positive, consistently with the evidence of LLSV
(1997). However, this increase in the breadth of the equity market is not necessarily
associated with a reduction in the agency costs of external finance, as shown in Figure 3.
3. Data
We are interested in capturing the empirical relationship between the legal protection of
shareholders' rights and the return on equity. To this end, we use data from different sources.
To measure the return on equity, we rely on three different types of data: total returns on
national stock markets, accounting measures of the return on equity, and the excess return on
primary equity issues as measured by IPO underpricing.
3.1.  Returns on National Stock Markets
Our sample of national stock markets includes data for both developed markets from
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and emerging markets from the Emerging12
Market Database (EMDB), provided by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the
World Bank.
We draw monthly equity indices for 21 developed countries from MSCI. For eighteen of
these, the sample starts on December 1969. For the remaining three, it starts on December
1987 (see Table A1 for summary statistics about MSCI markets). All indices extend to
December 1999. These indices are value-weighted and are calculated with dividend
reinvestment. MSCI also provides a value-weighted World Index, which serves as the market
portfolio for developed countries.
7 As far as emerging markets are concerned, the starting date
of coverage by EMDB differs more significantly across markets (see Table A2 for summary
statistics related to the emerging markets sub-sample). For all countries, the sample extends to
December 1999. As for MSCI data, the indices are value-weighted and calculated with
dividend reinvestment.
8
All returns are expressed in US dollars and are calculated in excess of the yield on the US
Treasury bill that is closest to 30 days to maturity on the last trading day of the month. This
latter yield is drawn from the CRSP government bond file (see Fama (1984) for the
computation of holding period returns). This yield is available to us up to November 1999. As
a consequence, our sample of total excess returns also ends at this date.
3.2. Accounting Measures of the Return on Capital
Data on valuation ratios (such as price-earning ratios, price-book value ratios and dividend
yield) are available for the same countries from the respective above-mentioned sources on an
annual basis. We also have data from the IBES global aggregates. The IBES database
contains monthly valuation indices for selected (mainly developed) countries as well as
survey estimates of the expected growth in earnings per share. In our estimations (see results
in table 5 and 6) we use the price/earnings ratios and the dividend yields as dependent
variables. The price/earnings series is defined (see Datastream International for details) as the
“weighted average price/earnings ratio based on 12-month forward earnings” (IBES datatype:
A12PE). The dividend yield is defined as “weighted dividend yield based on the indicated
annual dividend” (IBES datatype: ADVYLD). Furthermore we obtain series on the yield on
domestic 10-year government bonds (IBES datatype: AGBYLD) for a sample of 18
developed countries.
7  The MSCI indices are broadly representative of each country's market composition. Virtually all the stocks (99%) can be
traded by non-nationals as well as by domestic investors. As noted by Harvey (1991), the returns computed on the basis
of these indices are highly correlated with widely quoted country indices, such as the NYSE value-weighted return
(calculated by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago) for the USA, or the
Nikkei 255 index for Japan. For details on the methodology behind the MSCI indexes, see MSCI.
8  For the IFC methodology, see IFC. The selection criteria of the components of the MSCI and the IFC national indices are
similar, though not identical. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) describe the EMDB indexes and briefly compare the IFC and
MSCI methodologies.13
3.3. The Cost of Capital on the Primary Market
We use the IPO underpricing as a proxy of the total cost of capital for firms tapping the
equity capital markets for the first time. For the IPO data, our source is a study by Loughran,
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994), updated by Ritter (1998). These authors provide a collection of
estimates of average “IPO underpricing” in 32 countries.
3.4. Institutional Variables
Here we rely on the data set constructed by La Porta et al. (1998a). For a sample of 49
(both developing and developed) countries, they provide data on variables that capture: (i) the
legal protection of both creditors' and minority shareholders' property rights; (ii) the origin of
the national legal system; (iii) indices of the efficiency of legal enforcement; (iv) estimates of
the quality of accounting systems. While we refer the reader to La Porta et al. (1998a) for a
complete description of this interesting database and of their sources, here we briefly describe
the variables that we use in our regressions and their original sources.
The variable “Judicial Efficiency” is an assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the
legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms”. It is produced by the
country-risk rating agency Business International Corporation and is an average between 1980
and 1983, ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values associated with higher efficiency levels.
Other variables that we use were constructed by La Porta et al. (1998a). Among these, the
index “Anti-Director Rights” captures the degree of legal protection from expropriation by the
managers and controlling shareholders granted to minority shareholders. It ranges from 0 to 6,
with higher scores representing more thorough legal protection of minority shareholders. The
dummy variable “One Share/One Vote” equals one if in the country concerned ordinary
shares are required to carry only one vote per share and 0 otherwise. The variables “French
Origin”, “German Origin”, “Scandinavian Origin”, and “English Origin” are meant to indicate
the “family” to which the legal system of a given country belongs. These “legal origin”
dummies may capture residual cross-country differences in investor protection on top of those
specifically reflected in the “Anti-Director Rights” indicator.
Most other legal and institutional variables used here are produced by the country-risk
rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). Each variable is measured as the average of
the months of April and October of the corresponding ICR monthly index between 1982 and
1995, and ranges on a scale from 0 to 10 (in some cases, by re-scaling the original ICR
indices). The variable “Rule of Law” is ICR's “evaluation of the legal and order tradition in
the country”, with lower scores for countries with weaker legal and order tradition.
“Corruption” is an assessment of the degree of corruption in the government, with lower
scores indicating higher corruption. The “Risk of Contract Repudiation by the Government” is
an assessment of the “risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation,
postponement or scaling down” due to “budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in
the government, or a change in government economic and social objectives”. Lower scores
for this variable indicate higher risk. The variable “Risk of Expropriation” reflects ICR's
evaluation of the risk of “outright confiscation” or forced nationalization, with lower scores
indicating higher risk. Since the year-by-year values of these ICR variables are available for14
most of our sample periods, all the estimates reported in the next section were also repeated
using these yearly values instead of their averages. The results - not reported for brevity - are
qualitatively unchanged relative to those reported below.
Finally, the variable “Quality of Accounting Standards” is drawn from International
Accounting and Auditing Trends (Center for International Financial Analysis & Research,
Inc.), and measures the quality of companies' annual reports along 7 general dimensions
(general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting
standards, stock data and special items). In our complete sample of developed and emerging
markets, it ranges between 24 and 83, with a mean of 61 and a standard deviation of 13.5.
4. Results
In this section we report our estimation results, divided in three subsections, each devoted
to one of three alternative measures of the return on equity. In each subsection we describe the
empirical methodology of our tests. In subsection 4.1, we describe our findings on the
relationship between legal protection of minority shareholders and the return on equity on
secondary markets. The main problem we tackle in this case is the correction for risk. In
subsection 4.2, we report our results on the relationship between the institutional variables and
the different accounting measures of the return on equity, such as the dividend yield and the
earnings-price ratios, controlling for the effect of cross-country differences in expected
earnings growth. Finally, we check if legal and judicial variables also matter for the primary
equity market by investigating their correlation with estimates of IPO underpricing in
different countries provided in the literature.
4.1. The Secondary Market Return on Equity
A basic tenet of asset pricing theory is that the return on any asset can be decomposed in
two parts: the return on a “risk-free” asset and the compensation for undiversifiable risk. The
asset pricing models proposed in the literature differ as to the quantification of the
undiversifiable risk. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) expresses it as proportional to
the market beta of the asset, the proportionality factor being the market price for risk.
In the presence of agency problems between managers and shareholders, the expected
returns on equity may include a third component, as explained in Section 2. While this third
component may be hard to detect in any given country - where all firms operate under the
same jurisdiction - it should be easier to detect and quantify in a cross-section of countries,
where one can exploit the wide international variation in legal and judicial institutions which
affect the severity of these agency problems.
9 Our approach will explore if such variation in
9  Even in the context of a single country, agency costs can differ systematically across companies featuring different levels
of investment in intangible assets (such as R&D). This can conceivably induce cross-sectional differences in profitability
and in the cost of equity capital. For example, ceteris paribus, investors may require a large rate of return from an upstart15
the respect for the law, judicial enforcement, protection of minority shareholders, and
accounting standards can account for some of the international differences in the return to
equity, after controlling for risk.
Indeed, such a prediction would appear to be confirmed by a quick look at Figures 4 and 5.
There, we plot the average excess returns (over the period 1987-1999, chosen to maximize the
number of countries included) against the efficiency of the judicial system (Figure 4) and the
“rule of law” (Figure 5). In both cases, a negative unconditional correlation emerges from the
data. However, this may simply be a reflection of the pattern of riskiness across countries: we
need to purge our excess return measures of the risk premium, before we can conclude
anything about the relationships we are interested in. A regression analysis is therefore
required.
The basic econometric challenge in our approach is the measurement of the risk-adjusted
rate of return on capital. This measurement depends crucially on the assumptions one is
willing to make on the degree of integration of stock markets around the world as well as on
the validity of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hypothesis.
If capital markets are fully integrated internationally and PPP holds continuously, the
CAPM predicts that the risk premium on each country's stock market (as measured by the
excess return denominated in US dollars relative to the US risk-free rate) is proportional to
that country's Beta with respect to a world market portfolio. In fact, under the PPP hypothesis,
inflation differentials between countries are precisely offset by the depreciation of their
bilateral exchange rate. If PPP were not to hold, then the real exchange rate risk of each
country would be an additional risk factor priced on world stock markets. Adler and Dumas
(1983), Harvey (1991) and Dumas and Solnik (1995), among others, show that for developed
markets exchange rate risk is indeed priced. Ferson and Harvey (1993, 1994) recommend the
use of a two-factor model, by adding to the traditional factor (the return on a portfolio of
international stock market indices) the return on a portfolio of deposits in different currencies
with weights reflecting the world trade structure.
Also the assumption of integrated capital markets may fail in practice. While there might
be reasons to believe that international capital markets are increasingly integrated (owing to
the removal of capital controls in developing countries and the technology-driven reduction of
communication costs across borders), there is evidence that the process is gradual, not
complete and not unidirectional. If equity markets are internationally segmented, a country's
Beta does not (fully) capture the risk premium on its equity market, and in addition the real
rate of return on the risk-free asset may differ across countries. In this case the idiosyncratic
(country-specific) component of total risk should have explanatory power in the cross-section
of expected returns. As mentioned in the introduction, the literature indeed shows that the
“pure” international CAPM model typically has low explanatory power. Bekaert and Harvey
(1995) attribute its failure to the segmentation of national markets. Harvey (1995) offers
evidence on segmentation particularly for the emerging markets, by showing that the average
company with a large fraction of intangible assets, since the managers’ ability to extract private benefits may be higher
than in more mature companies. In the U.S., the literature has widely documented the role of firms' attributes like the
ratio of market to book value or the quota of intangible assets over total value in the explanation of cross-sections of
expected returns (see for example Fama and French (1993)). Some of the “anomalies” in this literature have been
interpreted along the lines of agency theory.16
return of these markets is positively correlated with the volatility of the market itself but not
with its Beta relative to the world portfolio.
We try to take the possibility of international segmentation into account by including
measures of country-specific residual risk among our regressors. We also estimate separately
our regressions for the sub-samples of developed markets, on the assumption that (at least in
relative terms) for emerging markets segmentation may be more of an issue.
We use two alternative methods to carry out our tests, which differ in the way we purge the
cross-section of unconditional expected returns from their risk premia. The two methods are
respectively in the footsteps of the time-honored multiple-steps procedures proposed by
Lintner (as reproduced in Douglas (1968)) and Fama and MacBeth (1973).
The first method consists of (i) estimating for each country a time-series regression of its
market's excess return on the excess return of the world market portfolio (and possibly other
risk factors), and (ii) regressing cross-sectionally the unconditional averages of the N
countries' excess returns (computed on the entire time interval) on the vector(s) of Beta(s)
estimated in step (i), on the sample estimates of country-specific residual risk and on the
institutional variables reported by La Porta et al. (1998a).
The second method, sometimes called “cross-sectional regression (CSR) method”,
involves for each month (i) estimating Betas on a preceding sample of, say, 5 years of data,
(ii) running cross-sectional regressions of excess realized returns on the estimated Betas, on
estimates of residual risk and - in our case - on institutional variables. The final estimated
coefficient is the time average of the coefficients obtained in step (ii), taking into account the
relative precision of the estimates (as explained below). Under the assumption of normality of
excess returns, these “averaged” coefficients, once divided by their standard deviations, are
distributed as t-statistics, thus allowing simple t-tests for inference purposes.
4.1.1. Lintner Regressions: Developed Markets
In Table 1, we report the results of the first estimation procedure, for the sample of
developed markets. The sample includes all countries that are present in the MSCI database
from 1970, and extends to November 1999.
10 We estimate a first-stage regression of the
monthly total excess returns on the excess return of the world market portfolio and on an
exchange rate risk factor. The monthly excess return of the world market portfolio is the
MSCI-provided world index.
11 The exchange rate risk factor is the change in the log of the G-
10 exchange rate index (obtained from the Federal Reserve System Web page). The G-10
exchange rate index is a trade-weighted average of the bilateral exchange rate between the US
dollar and the 10 main trading economies (the G-7 countries, not including the US, plus the
10  As said above, we only have data for the “Fama risk-free rate” up to November 1999.
11  We also used the value-weighted average of the excess returns on all the markets in the MSCI and EMDB databases that
are active in that month, with no qualitative change in results.17
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland). The change in the log of this index
approximates the excess return on a trade-weighted portfolio of foreign-currency bonds,
assuming that the trade weights are known and that a trade-weighted combination of foreign
currency deposit rates in the 10 countries is close to the US bill rate.
12 A positive change in
the G-10 index indicates a depreciation of the dollar.
This first-stage regression is used to obtain estimates for the beta and the real exchange
rate risk sensitivity of each market. In column 1 of Table 1, we report our preferred
specification of the international asset pricing model for developed markets. As expected, beta
enters with a positive coefficient (the average market price for risk is .01 on a monthly basis).
Exchange risk enters with a negative sign, as expected: market indices that are positively
correlated with depreciation in the dollar exchange rate are less risky (since they offer
hedging against loss in the value of the dollar) and hence offer a lower excess return.
13
In the specification of column 2, we introduce “Judicial Efficiency” among the explanatory
variables. The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant, indicating that in
countries with more efficient judiciary systems the excess return on equity capital is larger.
This result is clearly the opposite of what suggested by Figure 4. The estimated value (.0007)
of the coefficient on this variable implies that a move from the average value for these
markets of 9.37 to a perfect 10 would be associated with a 53 basis point increase of the
required return on a yearly basis. It should be noticed that “Judicial Efficiency” has rather
little variation among the developed markets. In most of them it is at the highest level of 10.
Italy and Spain are the only countries where it is substantially lower - around 6. This implies
an astonishing result for Italy and Spain: if their judicial efficiency had been in line with other
countries its required return on equity would have been raised by about 3.4% per annum. As
we shall see, the sign and precision of the estimated effect of “Judicial Efficiency” carries
over well beyond this sample.
In column 3, we include the index “Anti-Director Rights” among the explanatory variables.
Its coefficient is not significantly different from zero. In columns 4 and 5, we repeat the
specifications in columns 2 and 3, after replacing the index “Judicial Efficiency” with the
variable “Rule of Law”, and find similar results. The point estimate for the coefficient of Rule
of Law is positive, although not precisely estimated. As in column 3, the estimated coefficient
of the anti-director rights variable is not statistically different from zero.
We also tried the specifications for columns 2 and 3 using other indices from La Porta et
al. (1998a), such as measures of corruption in the government, risk of expropriation, risk of
contract repudiation by the government, and the perceived quality of accounting standards.
The small number of observations and the high degree of collinearity of the indices prevented
us from including all of them simultaneously in our specifications. The coefficients of these
12  Ferson and Harvey (1993) adopt a mimicking portfolio approach, i.e. they construct a portfolio that is maximally
correlated to the change in the log of G-10, and they compute its excess return. When they use this portfolio excess return
instead of the simple change in the log of G-10, they obtain similar results.
13  We tested for deviations from the CAPM, by including among the regressors the square of beta and the variance of the
residuals of our market model regressions - a proxy of unsystematic risk. The coefficients of both variables were not
significantly different from zero.18
indices are not significantly different from zero, while the coefficients on the two risk-factors
included in the baseline specification of column 1 are virtually unchanged.
We also estimated a specification (not reported) that includes the legal origin dummies
among the regressors. None of them turned out with a statistically significant coefficient, and
the estimates of all the other coefficients remained qualitatively unaffected. However, we fear
that this may be at least partly due to the paucity of the degrees of freedom.
4.1.2. Lintner Regressions: All Markets
In Table 2, we extend the sample size to include as many markets as possible, while
requiring all markets to be included over the same time interval and at the same time keeping
the interval long enough to allow reasonably precise estimates of the risk factors' sensitivities.
To balance these conflicting desiderata, the best strategy appeared to be to include all the
markets that enter the MSCI and EMDB databases before 1988. We compute the average
excess returns and the sensitivities using monthly data over the interval between January 1987
and November 1999.
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Including both developed and emerging markets in the same empirical asset pricing
specification presents some challenges. The empirical international finance literature, briefly
surveyed above, has consistently found that possibly different risk factors are priced in the
two subsets of markets. This can be seen also in Figure 6 (which plots the capital market lines
for MSCI and EMDB countries) and Figure 7 (which plots the relationships between average
excess returns and idiosyncratic risk in developed and emerging markets). Therefore we adapt
a pragmatic approach and let the data guide us in the selection of the relevant factors needed
to purge the excess returns of their risk premium component.
In the specification of column 1 of Table 2 we let the estimated values for betas, real
exchange rate risk sensitivities and idiosyncratic risks free to affect differently the average
returns in the two sub-samples of countries.
15 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients of the real exchange risk sensitivity, of the idiosyncratic risk for developed
markets and of the betas for emerging markets are jointly equal to zero. Therefore, we adopt
the constrained specification of column 2 as our baseline specification.
In column 3 we include the measure of judicial efficiency, and its estimated coefficient is
positive, though not precisely estimated. In column 4 we include also the index for the legal
protection of minority shareholders, and its coefficient is negative but not significant.
In column 5 and 6 we perform the same tests using the index for the rule of law as the
measure of institutional quality. In both columns 5 and 6, the estimated coefficient is positive
14  Including Finland, Ireland and New Zealand, that enter the MSCI database in 1988, does not alter the results.
15  We also included in the list of risk factors the squares of the betas, but found that they do not have independent
explanatory power. We also allowed a different intercept for EMDB countries, but its estimated coefficient was not
significantly different from zero.19
and significantly different from zero. In our sample for Table 2, the index for rule of law
varies between 2.08 (Colombia) and a perfect ten of several developed countries (the mean is
7.26). Relative to the mean value, a one-standard deviation lower value for the index is
associated with a decrease in the annualized risk-adjusted return on equity of 4.6 percentage
points. In column 6, the coefficient for the index of the minority shareholders’ rights is again
negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The pattern of results from columns 3 and 4 is found when any of the other indexes from
ICRG is used. For the sake of brevity, we only report the results including the “Rule of Law”
index. As a general rule, firms in countries with better values for these indices (i.e., where
corruption is perceived to be less widespread or the risks of expropriation and contract
repudiation are lower) reward equity capital with a higher rate of return. The accounting
standards and the antidirector rights variables, instead, enter the regression with coefficients
that are not significantly different from zero.
The results in both Table 1 and Table 2 provide evidence for segmentation in equity
markets. As argued above, with perfectly integrated equity markets, the quality of the
institutional environment is expected to affect negatively (if at all) the risk-adjusted return on
equity. The model presented above helps understand through which channels better
institutions can be associated with higher risk-adjusted expected returns under segmented
markets. When interpreting this evidence, an important caveat should be kept in mind.
Namely, the positive coefficients may result from a sample selection bias similar to that
studied by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999). The true relationship between the return on equity
capital and, say, judicial efficiency may be negative, at least when this variable takes very low
values, but we may fail to detect it because below a minimum threshold for judicial efficiency
the stock market in an emerging economy simply does not exist. In these situations, the
required return on equity is effectively infinite.
4.1.3. Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regressions: Developed Markets
The empirical specifications in the above two subsections relate cross-sectional average
excess returns to cross-sectional average sensitivities to the relevant risk factors and to
institutional variables. A more flexible way to test whether, after controlling for the risk
premium component of excess returns, a role is also played by institutional factors is to use
the Generalized Least Squares methodology proposed by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1979), as a refinement of the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach, widely used in explaining the
cross-section of stock returns.
This procedure involves estimating an empirical model of the form:
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 which includes the sensitivities of country index i to the relevant risk factors
estimated for month t and (a vector of ) the institutional variables for country i at time t, and
it e  is a disturbance with variance possibly changing across i and t.  N is the number of20
countries included in the estimation sample, and T is the number of time data points (i.e. the
number of monthly observations used in estimation). In equation (1) the sensitivities for
month t are estimated over the previous 5 years of monthly data (i.e. on the data for months t-
60 up to t-1).
The original Fama-Macbeth procedure consists of estimating equation (1) cross-sectionally
for each month, so as to obtain a time series of estimated coefficients  kt gˆ  for  k g , k=1,..,K. If
each of the estimates is assumed to be drawn from a stationary distribution, then the pooled
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However, this procedure does not take into account that the slope coefficients in the cross-
sections for different months are estimated with different precision. The refinement proposed
by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) addresses exactly this problem. They show that if
the monthly estimators  kt gˆ  are serially uncorrelated, the pooled GLS estimators  k gˆ  are the
weighted means of the monthly estimates, where the weights are inversely proportional to the
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In Table 3 we report the results from this estimation procedure for the 18 developed
markets for which return data are available from January 1970 in the MSCI database. Because
we use 5 years of preceding data to obtain the estimates for the betas and the real exchange
risk sensitivities, we run 299 cross-section regressions for the months from January 1975 to
November 1999.
In column 1, we report our preferred specification for the asset pricing model. In line with
column 1 of Table 1, in our baseline specification for the risk-premium we include both a
country’s beta relative to the excess return on the world market portfolio and a country’s
sensitivity with respect to real exchange rate change. We find that the market prices for these21
two sources of risk have the expected sign, although the estimated market price for covariance
risk is not statistically different from zero.
16’
17
In column 2 we insert also the index for the efficiency of the judicial system. As in Table
1, we find that the equity markets of countries with more efficient judicial systems pay a
higher total excess return. In column 3 we include the score “Anti-Director Rights” among the
regressors and find that its coefficient is very small and not significantly different from zero.
Columns 4 and 5 repeat the specifications of columns 2 and 3, replacing the efficiency of the
judicial system with the “Rule of Law” index. As in Table 1, the estimated coefficient of the
latter variable is positive, though estimated less precisely than that of judicial efficiency.
In specifications that we do not report for brevity, we also investigate the relationship
between the risk-adjusted return on equity and the degree of perceived corruption among the
government officials. We find that in countries where corruption is less of a problem, the
excess return over and above the reward for risk is higher, consistently with the results from
the Lintner estimation procedure reported in subsection 4.1.1. The only ICRG index which is
weakly negatively associated with the risk-adjusted return is the measure of the risk of
expropriation. This index varies very little in the sub-sample of developed markets included in
Table 3. The weakly negative coefficient appears to be sensitive to the inclusion of Hong
Kong in the sample.
18
The dummy variables for the origin of the legal systems, instead, never have any
explanatory power in conjunction with the other institutional variables, particularly with the
rule-of-law index, and for brevity we do not report the corresponding specifications.
4.1.4. Fama-Macbeth Cross-sectional Regressions: All Markets
In Table 4 we report results from the Lintzerberger-Ramaswamy estimation procedure for
the same sample covered in Table 2, i.e. the cross section of the developed and emerging
markets whose returns data are available at least from 1982.
19
As usual, in column 1 we propose our preferred specification for the underlying model of
the risk premium. In our specification search, we proceeded as for Table 2. We started by
allowing beta, the real exchange risk sensitivity and the idiosyncratic risk to impact
16  The estimated coefficients on beta may fail to pass the statistical significance test in this formulation due to inherent non-
linearities in the relationship between excess returns and betas. We have considered a quadratic form for beta (along the
lines of the specification used by the original Fama-Macbeth (1973) article). Although we did find some evidence for
non-linearity, the results for the institutional variables reported below were qualitatively unaffected.
17  We test and reject the hypothesis that the idiosyncratic risk has additional explanatory power, and therefore this variable
is not included in the results of Table 3.
18  Indeed, if one excludes Hong Kong from the sample, the coefficient on the risk of expropriation is positive (higher
returns in countries with lower risk), and statistically significant.
19  We want our estimation to cover the same period (1987-1999) as in Table 2. We require 5 years of data to estimate the
betas and hence include a country in the sample only if we have its rate of return starting on or before 1982.22
differently the expected excess return in the two sub-samples (developed and emerging
markets). We found that one cannot reject the hypotheses that the idiosyncratic risk matters
only for emerging markets, that the impact of beta is the same across the two sub-samples and
that, controlling for these risk factors, the real exchange risk factor does not have explanatory
power.
In column 2 we extend the list of regressors to include the score for “Judicial Efficiency”
and, in line with the results in the previous sections, we find it positively related to the risk-
adjusted excess returns. In column 3, we include the index “Anti-Director Rights” together
with the measure of judicial efficiency, and find that its coefficient is small and statistically
not different from zero. In column 4 and 5 we repeat the specifications of columns 2 and 3,
replacing the “Judicial Efficiency” index with the score for “Rule of Law”. We find the same
pattern, with the index for rule of law positively associated with the risk-adjusted return on
equity and, controlling for the latter, no statistically significant effects for the index of “Anti-
Director Rights”. Agency problem considerations - as least insofar as they are proxied by the
synthetic index constructed by La Porta et al. (1998a) - do not appear to matter for the cross-
section of excess returns.
The main message of the last two subsections is that the basic results obtained with the
Lintner procedure in subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 are robust to time variation in both the
market price for risk and in the betas. Ferson and Harvey (1997) argue that, before concluding
that a significant coefficient on a variable other than beta represents a rejection of the
traditional CAPM, one needs to make sure that the variable itself has no informational content
for the cross-section of betas, whose true value is, after all, unobservable. In terms of our
exercise, good institutions may translate into higher expected returns because our measures of
institutional quality have informational content for beta.  However, our measures of
institutional quality do not change over time. Hence, it is hard to ascribe their effect on
expected returns to their impact on time-varying betas. We are inclined to conclude from the
data that expected returns are correlated with cross-country institutional differences even after
one controls for risk.
20
4.2. Accounting Measures of the Cost of Capital
From an accounting standpoint, the profitability of a listed company is often measured by
valuation ratios such as the dividend yield and the earnings/price ratio. In equilibrium, this
profitability coincides with the return that shareholders require to hold the shares of the
company in their portfolio. By its nature, this measure needs to be adjusted, in an international
comparison, for different inflation and growth prospects. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and
Errunza and Miller (1998), among others, rely on the dividend yield as a measure of the cost
of capital. As pointed out by Bekaert and Harvey (1997, p. 9), “the dividend yield has the
20  There is no reason to expect that we underestimate the beta of countries with good institutions and overestimate it for
countries with poor institutions, as would be required to interpret the positive effect of institutions on expected returns
along the lines of compensation for “hidden” risk.23
advantage of being directly measurable - that is, it need not be pre-estimated - and being a
stationary variable.”
In this sub-section, we use an augmented version of the so-called “Gordon model” of
security valuation to relate the cross-country dispersion in the return on equity to international
differences in legal and institutional settings. Under fairly general assumptions, the stock
market index in country i at time t,  it P , is the expected value of discounted dividends from the


















where  t E  is the expectation conditional on information known at time t,  j t i D + ,  is the
dividend paid out by the companies listed in country i at time t+j, and  j t i k + ,  is the per-period
risk-adjusted discount factor between time t and t+j relevant for the stream of dividends from
country i. The simplest version of this valuation approach assumes  i k  to be constant and
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specific to country i. Under these assumptions, the expected dividend yield becomes:
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Of course, to compute the risk-adjusted required rate of return one needs a model of the
equilibrium determination of the rates of return on stocks with different risk characteristics.
Under the international CAPM, the risk of stock market index i is only due to its covariance
with the world aggregate portfolio (and to its covariance with real exchange rate movements,
if the latter is priced). If in addition the required rate of return on equities depends on the
institutional variables capturing the efficiency of the legal and judiciary systems and the
degree of protection of minority shareholders,  i k  may be augmented as follows:
) ( ) ( i i i i L p f k g b + = (8)
where  i b  is the country's vector of betas with the relevant risk factors,  ) (× p  is a polynomial
and  it L  is a vector of variables proxying for the quality of legal institutions and the degree of
investor's protection in country i. If the classic international CAPM holds, then
i i i i r f hb a b + = ) ( , where h  is the market price for risk (defined as the excess return on the
risk-free rate of the world stock market),  i r  is the yield on a long-term “risk-free” domestic
security (in the estimation we use the yield on a 10-year government bond, drawn from the
IBES database), and  0 = g . The nominal domestic interest rate must be included, since our
estimates of the expected growth in earnings per share are in nominal terms and the dividend
yields are denominated in different currencies. As a result, we must allow for different yields
to reflect different expected inflation rates, even if all other factors were the same across
markets. In the estimation, we shall allow for time-varying  i k ’s, that is, we shall let the
expected return on country i’s stock market index vary over time. However, the fact that for
some dates data are available only for a few markets prevents a cross-sectional regression24
approach and therefore limits the flexibility of the functional form for the required rate of
return in equation (8). We impose that the market price for risk and the coefficient g  on the
“institutional variables” be constant, that is:
) ( , it it it t i L p r k g hb a + + =
Imposing this linear specification for the risk premium component of the return on equity
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where the restriction  1 - = d  should hold if (i) this simple version of Gordon’s model were
true and (ii) if our measure of dividend growth were free of measurement errors. In fact, we
expect neither of these to be true. First, the expected growth of dividends is unlikely to be
constant, as assumed in the derivation of (7). In addition, our proxy of expected dividend
growth - being a survey-based measure - may be vitiated by measurement errors, due for
example to the selection of survey respondents, or to imperfect coincidence between their
reference portfolio and the country portfolio used to construct our dividend yields. Last but
not least, we proxy dividend growth with earnings growth, which is inappropriate unless
payout ratios are constant. For all these reasons, we do not expect the restriction  1 - = d  to
hold in our regressions.
Equation (9) can be estimated for each time period for which we have data on the dividend
yield of the stock market index. It requires an estimate for  it b . This, as before, can be
obtained by a first-stage regression of the market i total (excess) return on the world excess
return up to a time period strictly before t, so as to avoid covariance between  it b  and  it e . In
the empirical specification, we allow for the possibility of cross-market correlation and
heteroskedasticity for the errors  it e , as well as for clustering of the error terms within each
country.
Notice also that from equation (9) different specifications can be derived, which involve
other familiar (and widely used in practice) accounting measures of value. For example, if one
assumes that dividends are a common fraction of earnings in all countries, then one
immediately obtains another testable specification involving earning-price ratios:
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where the superscript primes indicate that the coefficients in (10) may differ from the
analogous coefficients in (9) because of division by the payout ratio b, assumed to be
common across countries and constant over time. Since, however, differences in tax treatment
of dividends across countries may affect payout ratios, we include a measure of the relative
stance of the tax system towards different uses of earnings as a separate regressor in our
estimation. The measure is drawn from La Porta et al. (1998b), who actually find that payout
ratios are only tenuously correlated with the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital
gains.25
4.2.1. Dividend Yields
Our empirical results for the dividend yields are reported in Table 5. Here we estimate
equation (9) with monthly observations on the dividend yields for 18 developed markets. We
cannot include emerging markets for lack of data. In the columns of this table we report
various specifications, which include different institutional variables in the vector p(L). To
interpret our results, it is useful to keep in mind the scale of the dependent variable in our
regression. In our sample, the average dividend yield is 0.027, its standard deviation is 0.0115
and its range is between 0.002 and 0.079.
In column 1, we report our baseline specification. We include the domestic government
bond yield, the expected growth in earnings per share and the market beta as the determinants
of the required rate of return. We estimate market i’s beta for month t by regressing market i’s
excess return on the world market portfolio's excess return for the previous 60 months.
Consistently with our theoretical model, we find positive coefficients on the domestic
government bond yield, and a negative (though imprecisely estimated) coefficient for the
expected growth in earnings per share. These results hold in all the specifications of Table 5.
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In our baseline specification, we also include the legal origin dummies, and the dummy
variable “One Share/One Vote”. We allow for the differential tax treatment of dividends to
have an impact on the dividend policy of firms, by including the variable “Dividend Tax
Preference” from La Porta et al. (1998b). This variable is defined as the ratio of the net-of-
taxes value to outside shareholders of 1 dollar in earnings distributed out as dividends to the
net-of-taxes value of 1 dollar of earnings retained in the firm. It is meant to capture the extent
of tax disadvantage borne by dividends relative to capital gains.
Even after controlling for undiversifiable risk and adjusting the accounting measures for
differences in expected inflation and growth prospects, the legal origin dummies play an
important role in explaining the cross-sectional behavior of the dividend yield. Using this
measure of the return on equity, countries with German and Scandinavian legal systems have
lower risk-adjusted equity returns than English-origin countries. The coefficient of the “One
Share/One Vote” variable is negative, consistently with agency theories of corporate
governance. The coefficient of the tax variable has the expected positive sign, although it is
not precisely estimated (and it is small: a move from the average 0.75 to a non-distorting
value of 1 would increase the dividend yield by 0.0001, or 8.4% of a standard deviation).
22
The regression has a good fit: the  2 R  for the specification in column 1 is 0.635.
In column 2, we further include the index for the degree of legal protection of minority
shareholders from managers’ opportunism (“Anti-Director Rights”). Consistently with our
21  The estimated market price for risk is positive, although not always statistically significant.
22  For an analysis of the possible reasons why dividend payouts across markets appear to be so little sensitive to tax
considerations, see La Porta et al. (1998b). On an intuitive level, signalling theories of dividends (and, in particular,
“burning money” theories of dividends) argue that firms use dividends exactly because they are a relatively costly way of
disboursing cash out to shareholders, to signal their financial strength. Hence they might explain why in countries where
dividends are more costly they are used relatively more often. See Bernheim (1990) for an example of such theories.26
results for this variable in the previous section, we find a negative but statistically
insignificant coefficient (-0.0013). We find that the effects of differences in the four legal
origins are not fully absorbed by differences in the legal protection of minority shareholders.
The coefficients of the Scandinavian and German origin dummies maintain their sign and
their significance increases somewhat upon controlling for the degree of minority
shareholders’ protection. The coefficient on the French legal origin dummy turns negative,
possibly reflecting this variable’s negative correlation with the LLSV measure of minority
shareholders’ legal protection.
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In column 3, we include our measure of judicial efficiency. Consistently with our results in
the previous section, we find that firms in countries with a higher degree of judicial efficiency
pay a higher risk-adjusted return on their equity capital (our index has an average of 9.27,
with a range between 6.25 and 10). The other variables' coefficients are significantly different
from zero. In column 4 we include the anti-director rights index, and we obtain a negative
estimate, once again statistically undistinguishable from zero. The 
2 R  in the specifications of
columns 3 and 4 is a remarkable 0.71.
In columns 5 and 6 we repeat the specifications of columns 3 and 4 respectively,
controlling for the rule of law index in lieu of the efficiency of the judicial system. Again, we
find that such a variable enters with a positive and economically relevant positive
coefficient.
24 At the same time, the anti-director rights index enters with a negative sign. In
both columns 5 and 6 however, the coefficients on these two variables are not precisely
estimated.
In column 7 we repeat the specification of column 6 (including the anti-director rights
score) but we also control for the quality of accounting standards. This turns out to enter with
a positive and significant coefficient.
25 The same is true for the other measures of quality of
the business environment: corruption in government, risk of contract repudiation and risk of
expropriation. However, the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant, which may
reflect the fact that these variables exhibit limited variation across developed markets.  The
specifications including these latter three variables are not reported for brevity.
26
23  We find that including the anti-director rights score reduces the coefficient on the French dummy across all our proposed
specifications (see below).
24  The rule of law index averages 9.34 in our sample and has a range from 7.8 to a perfect 10. A move from 7.8 to 10 is
associated, through our point estimate, to an increase in the dividend yield of 0.0037, or 31% of its standard deviation.
25  The index for accounting standards averages 68.23 in our sample, and has a range between 54 and 83. Through our point
estimate (0.0003) therefore this variable can potentially explain an increase in the dividend yield of 0.0003*(83-
54)=0.0087, or 75% of its standard deviation.
26  We have re-estimated all the specifications included in Table 5 controlling for real exchange rate risk. The results are
unaffected and are not reported for brevity.27
4.2.2. Earnings-Price Ratios
In Table 6 we report our results for the earnings-price (EP) ratios. Again, data limitations
constrain us to the set of developed markets. The dependent variable is defined as the
reciprocal of the PE ratio as obtained from IBES.
27 From equation (10) we expect to find that
the domestic government bond yield and the beta enter with a positive sign, while the
expected growth rate in earnings per share with a negative one. Table 6 confirms the results
from the previous subsection on the estimated impact of measured institutional differences on
the international dispersion of return on equity.
In column 1, as usual, we report our baseline specification. This includes the domestic
government bond yield, the expected growth in earnings per share and the beta with the world
market portfolio (estimated on the previous 60 months, market by market), as well as the one-
share/one-vote dummy and the origin dummies.
28 To interpret our results, the reader should
keep in mind that our dependent variable averages 0.069 in the sample, has a standard
deviation of 0.0216 and a range between 0.014 and 0.135. The domestic bond yield, the
expected growth rate and beta all enter with coefficients whose signs are in line with our a-
priori expectations (although the estimated market price for risk is again not statistically
significant).
As in all the previous tables referring to developed countries, all our institutional variables
enter with positive signs. The “general environment” variables (i.e. the efficiency of the
judicial system, the rule of law, the degree of corruption among government officials, the risk
of contract repudiation and of expropriation, the quality of accounting standards), all increase
the required return on equity, ceteris paribus. The degree of protection of minority
shareholders enters with a negative sign, but it is never precisely estimated. And, again as in
Table 5, the Scandinavian and German origin dummies' impact goes in the direction of
making the average return on equity lower in the corresponding countries than in the English
origin one. Anglo-Saxon markets appear to have conditionally larger returns on equity than all
other developed countries’ markets, after controlling for both risk and measured institutional
differences.
The one-share/one-vote dummy enters with a large and negative coefficient, in accordance
with the predictions of the agency theory of the cost of external funds, as well as with our
results in the previous subsection. For instance, Japan and Singapore, who have the one-
share/one-vote compulsory requirement in their commercial codes, ceteris paribus have a
significantly lower EP ratio than markets that lack this legal provision.
27  We use the earnings/price ratio instead of the price/earning ratio to avoid the problems that arise when earnings are very
small (see also Ferson and Harvey, 1997).
28  In the specifications we report, we do not include the dividend preference variable, as the theory suggests that it should
not matter. However, we have run the same regressions that we report in table 6 including the dividend tax preference
variable. Although usually precisely estimated, its coefficient changes sign across specifications, making us somewhat
skeptical as to its interpretation. It enters with a positive sign if one controls for the anti-director rights score, otherwise it
enters with a negative sign.28
4.3. The Excess Return on Equity in the Primary Market
In the primary market, the excess return earned on new issues in the first days immediately
after the quotation coincides with the so-called initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. So
in this section we use the estimates of IPO underpricing described in subsection 3.3 to
investigate whether international differences in this variable can be explained by cross-
country differences in the institutional variables analyzed throughout the paper. The evidence
is to be taken with a grain of salt due to the paucity of the sample and the heterogeneity of the
measures of IPO underpricing.
Theory suggests that differences in accounting standards should be a key explanatory
variable of the international variation in IPO underpricing. The presence of IPO underpricing
is generally viewed as the product of informational asymmetries between the generality of
investors (the “uninformed” bidders) and the “smart money” in the market for new issues.
Shares initially quote at a discount to compensate the uninformed investors for their expected
losses to the better-informed ones. This informational asymmetry and the resulting IPO
discount are likely to be greater where accounting practices are lax and opaque.
Figure 8 is consistent with the prediction of the theory: there is a simple negative
correlation between IPO underpricing and accounting standards.
29 This result is confirmed by
the regression reported in the first column of Table 7: the correlation is indeed negative and
precisely estimated. In the rest of Table 7 we investigate if this result is robust to the
introduction of other institutional variables among the explanatory variables. The correlation
remains negative and significant when one controls for most of the other institutional
variables, such as anti-director rights (whose coefficient is - surprisingly - positive, though
not precisely estimated) and rule of law (column 4). In specifications that include corruption,
risk of contract repudiation and the “one-share/one-vote” variable (not reported), the latter
does not enter with a significant coefficient.
The magnitude and precision of the coefficient of the accounting standards variable are
considerably reduced only when the measure of judicial efficiency is entered as an additional
explanatory variable, presumably due to their collinearity. In fact, Figure 9 confirms a strong
negative correlation between IPO underpricing and judicial efficiency. This probably captures
simply the fact that where courts can be trusted to do their job honestly and efficiently,
accountants can be trusted to do the same: their honesty and accuracy may partly result from
the threat of swift judicial suits if they misbehave.
Altogether, the main result in this table appears to be the fact that good accounting
standards appear to reduce the cost of capital on primary equity markets. The special
relevance of this institutional variable in the context of the primary equity market accords
well with the theory.
29 In figures 8 and 9, some countries appear more than once. This is because, for those countries, we have data on the
average IPO underpricing for different issuing procedures. The letter in parenthesis after the country’s name indicates to
which issuing procedures the observation refers, following the same convention as in Table 7. The letter “a (b)” indicates
that in the IPO the offer price is fixed before (after) the acquisition of information and the allocation is discretionary. The
letter “c” indicates that in the IPO the offer price is fixed before the acquisition of information and the allocation is not
discretionary. The letter “e” signals the presence of binding regulatory constraints (see Table 2 in Loughran et al., 1994).29
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we estimate the correlation between the quality of the institutional
environment and the required return on equity for a cross-section of national stock market
indices from both developed and emerging markets. We use several measures of the return on
equity, such as the total return on national equity markets (controlling for risk premia),
accounting measures of firms’ profitability such as dividend yields and earning-price ratios
(controlling for international differences in growth and inflation), and IPO average excess
returns (IPO underpricing).
We find an interesting set of regularities. First, when we use secondary market returns on
equity, all our estimates reveal a positive correlation between the risk-adjusted return on
equity and “general” measures of the quality of institutions, like efficiency of the judicial
system, respect for the law, lack of corruption among government officials, quality of
accounting standards and low risk of contract repudiation and nationalization. The same
results are found when we use accounting measures of the rate of return on equity: both the
dividend yield and the earnings-price ratio are positively correlated with these general
measures of the quality of institutions.
As explained in section 2, these findings can be rationalized only in the context of
imperfectly integrated equity markets. When the world capital markets are not fully
integrated, the supply of funds at the national level is upward sloping, rather than perfectly
horizontal. In this scenario, our findings can result from two types of effects of better
institutions. First, more effective courts and higher respect for the law can reduce the amount
of private benefits that the management can extract from corporate resources, thus allowing
companies to credibly pledge higher returns to investors. Second, better institutions can have
a positive effect on the profitability of companies, quite apart from their impact on financial
relationships. Since a wider menu of contracts can be effectively enforced, the marginal
productivity of physical investment is increased: there is more demand for equity funding in
equilibrium and hence a higher rate of return. Notice that both types of effects would result in
an increase in the amount of equity funding used by companies, consistently with the
evidence in La Porta et al. (1997).
Our finding may appear harder to reconcile with one of the results of Demirgüc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998): they report that the return on assets of the firms in their sample is
negatively correlated with the same rule-of-law indicator used in our study, controlling for
various macroeconomic variables (inflation, deposit bank assets and stock market
capitalization divided by GDP, etc.). The contradiction between the two studies - apart from
the different measures of profitability and data used - may however be due to the fact that
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic fail to control for risk in their regression. As we know from
Figure 2, the unconditional correlation between the return on equities and rule-of-law is
clearly negative. Nevertheless our regressions show that, once risk is controlled for, the partial
correlation between these variables is positive.
Our second key result concerns the protection of shareholder rights. We find that the
return on equity is basically uncorrelated with the measure of shareholder rights proposed in
La Porta et al. (1998). This may either be due to the fact that the index constructed by La
Porta et al. does not fully capture all the features of the legal codes and of the regulatory30
apparatus that determine the degree of protection of shareholders’ rights (as argued for
example by Coffee (1999)). Or it may be due to the fact that, when the law does not protect
minority shareholders, large shareholders typically arise to overcome this problem (as argued
by La Porta et al. (1998a)). This result parallels the one by Bhattacharya and Daouk (1999),
who investigate the effect on the cost of equity capital of insider trading regulation and find
that, while the mere existence of laws prohibiting insider trading is ineffectual, their
enforcement reduces the risk-adjusted expected return on equity.
Thirdly, we have found that the origin of the legal code is an important determinant of the
international variation in the risk-adjusted return on equity. This is an important result,
because the origin dummies are, among all the variables we use, probably those that can be
more safely thought to be truly exogenous. La Porta et al. (1997) found that countries in the
English legal tradition area have a bigger stock market capitalization relative to their GDP and
more external equity financing than countries in the French, German or Scandinavian legal
families. We find that - if one controls for general institutional features, such as the efficiency
of the judicial system, the rule of law or the quality of accounting standards - firms in the
German and the Scandinavian families pay a lower risk-adjusted return than firms in Anglo-
Saxon countries. If, as maintained by La Porta et al., shareholders are better protected in
Anglo-Saxon countries than they are in German and Scandinavian countries, then this finding
represents another piece of evidence for segmentation of international equity markets. It
points to the existence of non-zero risk-adjusted differentials in expected returns, even after
controlling for differences in the expected monitoring, auditing and other private costs
associated with different legal environments. Companies in Anglo-Saxon countries may be
able to pay a higher return because they are more profitable than comparable firms in other
countries, all else being equal, including measurable institutional differences. A possible
interpretation is that the “English origin” dummy captures some unmeasured characteristics in
the social organization of these countries that makes their companies more profitable than
companies located elsewhere. This result is of interest also because of its connection with
international differences in the equity premium puzzle documented by Jorion and Goetzmann
(1999).
Our fourth, and final, result concerns the cost of capital in the primary market. We find that
IPO underpricing - an important component of the total cost of capital for newly listed
companies - is negatively and significantly correlated with the quality of accounting
standards across countries. This accords with theories of IPO underpricing based upon
adverse selection, as in countries where accounting information is less reliable the
informational gap between informed and uninformed investors is bound to be larger at the
IPO stage.
Our analysis leaves a number of issues open to further inquiry. First, an intriguing issue is
which precise mechanism generates the positive correlation between the efficiency of judicial
enforcement of contracts and the return on equity. A second task is to test the robustness of
our results on more disaggregated data. Lombardo (2000) estimates the effect on the rate of
return on equity of changes in the institutional environment using a panel industry-level data,
controlling for other country-specific sources of international differentials in the risk-adjusted
expected return. He finds that, within a given country, improvements in the institutional
framework significantly reduce the risk-adjusted return on equity. Third, a fascinating line of
research involves endogenizing the evolution of the institutional framework, so as to
understand why some countries end up having and retaining “bad” institutions (for a step in
this direction, see Pagano and Volpin, 1999).31
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE EXCESS RETURN, RISK AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES IN DEVELOPED MARKETS
The dependent variable is the average monthly total excess return in US dollars for the markets of the MSCI
database present from January 1970. The safe rate of return is the yield on the 30-day maturity government bond
with closest maturity (source: "Fama files" from CRSP database). The average excess return is computed over
the period from Jan. 1970 to Nov.. 1999. Beta and the Exchange Rate Factor are computed from OLS
regressions estimated over the same intervals. Non-Systematic Risk is the standard deviation of the residuals
obtained from the same regressions. All other variables are from La Porta et al. (1998a). T-statistics, computed
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are reported underneath the estimated coefficients.










































Number of Obs. 18 18 18 18 18
R Squared .34 .44 .44 .34 .3735
TABLE 2
AVERAGE EXCESS RETURN, RISK AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
IN DEVELOPED AND EMERGING MARKETS
The dependent variable is the average monthly total excess return in US dollars for the (developed) markets of
the MSCI database and the (emerging) markets of the EMDB database, available from January 1987. The safe
rate of return is the yield on the 30-day maturity government bond with closest maturity (source: "Fama files"
from CRSP database). The average excess return is computed over the period from Jan. 1987 to Nov. 1999. Beta
and the Exchange Rate Factor are computed from OLS regressions estimated over the same intervals. Non-
Systematic Risk is the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from the same regressions. These variables
are interacted with dummy variables to allow for different slope coefficients in the MSCI and EMDB sub-
samples. All other variables are from La Porta et al. (1998a).  T-statistics, computed with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, are reported underneath the estimated coefficients.




































































Number of Obs. 37 37 37 37 37 37
R Squared .66 .65 .66 .66. .68 .6836
TABLE 3
AVERAGE SLOPES OF MONTHLY CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS OF RETURNS ON BETA,
EXCHANGE RATE RISK AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES IN DEVELOPED MARKETS
Monthly total excess returns in US dollars for the markets of the MSCI database are regressed each month on the
explanatory variables for the period from January 1975 to November 1997. For each month, both Beta and the
exchange rate risk sensitivity are estimated on the previous 60-month period. The safe rate of return is the yield
on the 30-day maturity government bond with closest maturity (source: "Fama files" from CRSP database). All
other variables are from La Porta et al. (1998a). Coefficients and standard errors are computed with the pooled
GLS estimators. T-statistics are reported underneath the estimated coefficients.





























Anti-director Rights - - .0001
(.30) - .0002
(.54)
Number of Obs. in
Cross-Sectional
Regressions
18 18 18 18 1837
TABLE 4
AVERAGE SLOPES OF MONTHLY CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS OF RETURNS ON BETA,
RESIDUAL RISK AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES IN DEVELOPED AND EMERGING MARKETS
Monthly total excess returns in US dollars for equity markets present in the MSCI and EMDB databases from
January 1982 are regressed each month on the explanatory variables for the period from January 1987 to
November 1999. The safe rate of return is the yield on the 30-day maturity government bond with closest
maturity (source: "Fama files" from CRSP database). For each year, Beta is estimated on the previous 60-month
period. Non-Systematic Risk in Emerging Markets is the standard deviation of the residuals from these first-
stage regressions, interacted with a dummy which equals one if the market is from the EMDB and zero
otherwise. All other variables are from La Porta et al. (1998a). Coefficients and standard errors are computed
with pooled GLS estimators. T-statistics are reported underneath the estimated coefficients.































Anti-director Rights - - .0003
(.56) - .0004
(.83)
Number of Obs. in
Cross-Sectional
Regressions
28 28 28 28 2838
TABLE 5
DIVIDEND YIELDS, RISK AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES IN DEVELOPED MARKETS
Monthly dividend yields, expected growth in earnings per share, and government bond yields are from the IBES
global aggregates database (Datastream International). The dividend yield is the weighted yield based on the
indicated annual dividend (IBES datatype: ADVYLD). “Growth in Earnings Per Share” is the weighted 12-
month-forward growth in earnings per share (EPS) (IBES datatype: A12GRO). “Government Bond Yield” is a
generic yield based on a local 10-year government bond (IBES datatype: AGBYLD). Beta for market i in month
t is estimated from market model regressions of market i’s excess return on the world market excess return in
months t-1,.., t-60. Institutional variables are from La Porta et al. (1998a). The data are an unbalanced panel of
the MSCI markets from January 1987 to November 1999. Heteroschedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported
underneath estimated coefficients.
R e g r e s s o r s 1234 567






















































































































































Of Obs. 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1394
R-squared .635 .640 .710 .711 .638 .643 .66539
 TABLE 6
EARNINGS/PRICE RATIOS, RISK AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES IN DEVELOPED MARKETS
Monthly data for earnings/price (EP) ratios, expected growth in earnings per share and government bond yield
are from the IBES global aggregates database (Datastream International). The EP ratio is the reciprocal of the
price/earnings (PE) data from IBES, defined as “Weighted average price/earnings ratio based on 12-month
forward earnings” (IBES datatype: A12PE). “Expected Growth in Earnings Per Share” is the weighted 12-
month-forward growth in earnings per share (EPS) (IBES datatype: A12GRO). “Government Bond Yield” is a
generic yield based on a local 10-year government bond (IBES datatype: AGBYLD). Beta for market i in month
t is estimated from market model regressions of market i’s excess return on the world market excess return in
months t-1,.., t-60. Institutional variables are from La Porta et al. (1998a). The data are an unbalanced panel of
the MSCI markets from March 1987 to November 1996. Heteroschedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported
underneath estimated coefficients.
R e g r e s s o r s 1234567



































































































































Number of Obs. 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1394
R-squared .620 .620 .645 .647 .624 .625 .62640
TABLE 7
IPO UNDERPRICING AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
The dependent variable is the average IPO underpricing reported by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994), as
updated by Ritter (1998). “One Share/One Vote” is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the legal system of the
country explicitly imposes that each share be given one and only one vote in the shareholders’ meetings, and 0
otherwise. The “dummy a (b)” equals 1 only if in the IPO the offer price is fixed before (after) the acquisition of
information and the allocation is discretionary. The “dummy c” equals 1 if in the IPO the offer price is fixed
before the acquisition of information and the allocation is not discretionary. The “dummy e” equals 1 only in the
presence of binding regulatory constraints (see Table 2 in Loughran et al., 1994). Heteroschedasticity-consistent
t-statistics are reported underneath estimated coefficients.
Regressors 1 2 3 4
Judicial Efficiency - - -.050
(-2.531) -


























































Number of Obs. 31 31 31 31
R-squared .650 .686 .729 .69941
TABLE A1








Australia Jan, 1970 0.116 0.084 0.255
Austria Jan, 1970 0.126 0.093 0.209
Belgium Jan, 1970 0.162 0.145 0.188
Canada Jan, 1970 0.114 0.098 0.185
Denmark Jan, 1970 0.156 0.135 0.187
Finland Jan, 1988 0.123 0.201 0.269
France Jan, 1970 0.144 0.125 0.233
Germany Jan, 1970 0.138 0.121 0.203
Hong Kong Jan, 1970 0.254 0.176 0.394
Ireland Jan, 1988 0.158 0.120 0.197
Italy Jan, 1970 0.102 0.071 0.264
Japan Jan, 1970 0.152 0.134 0.229
Netherlands Jan, 1970 0.172 0.154 0.177
New Zealand Jan, 1988 0.085 0.037 0.230
Norway Jan, 1970 0.160 0.109 0.267
Singapore Jan, 1970 0.167 0.131 0.295
Spain Jan, 1970 0.123 0.104 0.224
Sweden Jan, 1970 0.177 0.163 0.221
Switzerland Jan, 1970 0.155 0.133 0.189
UK Jan, 1970 0.158 0.129 0.246
USA Jan, 1970 0.130 0.127 0.151
Average 0.146 0.123 0.229
Median 0.152 0.127 0.22442
TABLE A2








Argentina Jan, 1976 0.571 0.204 0.926
Brazil Jan, 1976 0.256 0.080 0.560
Chile Jan, 1976 0.316 0.235 0.367
Colombia Jan, 1985 0.326 0.200 0.295
Egypt Jan, 1996 0.345 0.108 0.296
Greece Jan, 1976 0.094 0.089 0.335
India Jan, 1976 0.160 0.121 0.277
Indonesia Jan, 1990 -0.057 -0.097 0.359
Jordan Jan, 1979 0.100 0.081 0.168
Korea Jan, 1976 0.116 0.113 0.325
Malaysia Jan, 1985 0.065 0.037 0.288
Mexico Jan, 1976 0.259 0.143 0.429
Nigeria Jan, 1985 0.198 0.031 0.502
Pakistan Jan, 1985 0.149 0.064 0.263
Peru Jan, 1993 0.258 0.135 0.326
Philippines Jan, 1985 0.292 0.196 0.365
Portugal Feb, 1986 0.303 0.207 0.398
South Africa Jan, 1993 0.171 0.096 0.224
SriLanka Jan, 1993 0.041 -0.023 0.286
Taiwan, China Jan, 1985 0.289 0.166 0.476
Thailand Jan, 1976 0.125 0.095 0.297
Turkey Jan, 1987 0.444 0.186 0.684
Venezuela Jan, 1985 0.269 0.083 0.465
Zimbabwe Jan, 1976 0.125 0.053 0.350
Average 0.217 0.108 0.386
Median 0.227 0.102 0.34343
TABLE A3
SUMMARY STATISTICS: INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES (FROM LA PORTA ET AL. (1998A))
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation Min. Max.
Judicial Efficiency 8.311272 1.873544 3.25 10
Rule of Law 7.892043 2.281635 2.08 10
Corruption 7.688647 2.046631 2.92 10
Risk of Expropriation 8.674786 1.412053 5.22 9.98
Risk of Contract Repudiation 8.231078 1.618514 4.36 9.98
Accounting Standards 64.81173 10.03328 36 83
Antidirector Rights 2.979592 1.216035 0 544
mh0
FIGURE 1
REDUCTION OF PRIVATE BENEFITS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SEGMENTATION
This figure depicts the effects of an improvement in the legal system that reduces the fraction of the company’s
profits that the manager can divert. After this improvement, managers can credibly commit to return more
resources to outside investors: the demand for funds schedule shifts outward and the observed equilibrium point
shifts from A to C. The rate of return increases from mh0 to mh1 , while the cost of equity capital decreases from




















REDUCTION OF LEGAL AND AUDITING COSTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SEGMENTATION
This figure shows the effects of a reduction in the legal and auditing costs that shareholder must bear to monitor
managers. The investors’ supply of funds schedule shifts downward and to the right, and the observed
equilibrium point moves from A to C. The observed (expected) rate of return decreases from mh0 to mh1, while the
cost of equity capital to firms decreases, from hh0 (point B) to hh1 (point D). The equilibrium amount of equity





















INCREASE IN PROFITABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL SEGMENTATION
This figure shows the effects of an improvement of the legal environment which increases the marginal
productivity of capital. This is captured by an outward shift of the expected profitability schedule. The associated
increase in the demand for equity capital shifts the observed equilibrium point from A to C. The observed
(expected) rate of return increases (from mh0 to mh1). The cost of capital increases from hh0  (point B) to hh1 (point



















































Malaysia Canada Norway Germany India Australi
Thailand France Korea Philippines Singapo Switzerla UK Belgium Zimbabwe Denmar Spain Netherlan USA






































Malaysia Canada Norway Germany India Australi
Thailand France Korea Philippines Singapore Switzerla UK Belgium Zimbabwe Denmar Spain Netherlan USA






































Malaysia Canada Norway Germany India Australia
Thailand France Korea Philippines Singapore Switzerland UK Belgium Zimbabwe Denmark Spain Netherlands USA








 CML (MSCI Countries)
 CML (EMDB Countries)
FIGURE 6
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FIGURE 7






















































































































AVERAGE IPO UNDERPRICING VS. JUDICIAL EFFICIENC